Benjamin Libet kommt aufgrund seines berühmten Experimentes (Libet 2004, S. 268ff.) zu dem Schluss, dass einfache Handlungen (z. B. das kurze Bewegen eines Handgelenkes) nicht durch den freien Willen des Menschen eingeleitet werden, sondern (unbewusst) durch das Gehirn. Denn der Zeitpunkt des Aktionspotentials solcher Handlungen liegt regelmäßig vor dem Zeitpunkt, den die Versuchsperson als den Beginn ihres bewussten Ausführungswillens berichtet.
Wendet man dieses Ergebnis rückbezüglich auf die Versuchsbedingungen an, so führt es in einen Selbstwiderspruch: Libets Ergebnis entzieht dem Experiment, mit dem es erzielt wurde, die Grundlage.
Bei schlüssiger Interpretation zeigen Libets Experimente, dass das Bereitschaftspotential wie auch andere unbewusste physiologische Vorgänge Bedingungen für die Handlungsfreiheit darstellen, unter denen ein freies Handeln überhaupt erst möglich wird. Die Willensfreiheit wird durch diese Bedingungen nicht eingeschränkt oder in Frage gestellt.
N1 -As a result of his famous experiment, Benjamin Libet came to the conclusion that simple acts (e.g. a brief movement of the wrist) are not initiated through a person’s free will, but rather (unconsciously) through the brain. The reason for his conclusion is that the actual moment for the readiness potential of such actions consistently occurs before that point in time which the test subject reports as the beginning of his conscious intention to execute them. If this result is applied reflexively, i.e. to the conditions of the experiment, it will lead to an inherent contradiction: Libets’s result removes the basis of the very experiment through which it was obtained. A more rigorous interpretation of Libet’s experiments shows that the readiness potential, as well as other unconscious physiological processes, represent preconditions which ultimately enable freedom of action. Through these conditions, freedom of will is neither limited nor brought into question.
AB -As a result of his famous experiment, Benjamin Libet came to the conclusion that simple acts (e.g. a brief movement of the wrist) are not initiated through a person’s free will, but rather (unconsciously) through the brain. The reason for his conclusion is that the actual moment for the readiness potential of such actions consistently occurs before that point in time which the test subject reports as the beginning of his conscious intention to execute them. If this result is applied reflexively, i.e. to the conditions of the experiment, it will lead to an inherent contradiction: Libets’s result removes the basis of the very experiment through which it was obtained. A more rigorous interpretation of Libet’s experiments shows that the readiness potential, as well as other unconscious physiological processes, represent preconditions which ultimately enable freedom of action. Through these conditions, freedom of will is neither limited nor brought into question.
ST - Benjamin Libets experimenteller Beitrag zur Freiheitsfrage UR - https://dx.doi.org/10.18756/edn.87.43 Y2 - 2024-12-18 02:46:36 ER -