Summary
I demonstrate how morphological research and our view of plant form is influenced by philosophical assumptions that are associated with worldviews and how empirical research may affect these assumptions and worldviews. I examine the following nine worldviews: essentialism, including phenomenology, mechanism, the fuzzy worldview (the continuum worldview), the dynamic worldview (also referred to as contextualism and process philosophy), holism or the holistic worldview (also called organicism), perspectivism (including complementarity), the generating-substance worldview, animism, and mysticism. All of these worldviews complement one another. However, essentialism and mechanism are more limited and the generating-substance worldview seems not tenable in terms of a material substance. All the remaining worldviews may be subsumed under a holodynamic worldview in the most comprehensive sense according to which plants and their morphology are integrated with the environment and the universe. Goethe embraced all of these nine worldviews. Characterizing him only as a phenomenologist and his method only or mainly as intuitive judgement (anschauende Urteilskraft), as it has been done so often, appears rather incomplete, one-sided, misleading, and a disservice to the “all-embracing Goethe” (Cusset 1982) who could recognize very different perspectives and could even go beyond them toward the mysterious ground of everything.

Zusammenfassung
Plants appear in myriad forms. Our perception and understanding of these forms (plant morphology) is influenced by philosophical assumptions and associated worldviews that are more or less projected into the manifoldness of plant form. Furthermore, our empirical investigations of plant forms may affect the philosophical assumptions and worldviews. Thus, the philosophy of plant morphology deals with the interrelations of philosophy and the empirical study of plant form (e.g., Arber 1950, 1954).

Worldviews can be conceptualized in different ways and consequently different worldviews and different numbers of worldviews can be distinguished. In this article, I shall examine the following nine worldviews: essentialism (including phenomenology), mechanism, the fuzzy worldview (the continuum view), the dynamic worldview (also called contextualism and process philosophy), the holistic worldview or holism (also referred to as organicism), perspectivism (including complementarity), the generating-substance worldview, animism, and mysticism.

**Essentialism (including Phenomenology)**

According to essentialism and phenomenology (that implies essentialism) the world, including plant morphology, is a manifestation of essences, ideas or ideal forms. Most plant morphologists don’t talk about essences explicitly, but they often use mutually exclusive categories that may imply essences such as root, stem (caulome), and leaf (phyllome). Then the whole morphological diversity is forced into these categories. This becomes obvious when a structure is encountered that does not fit. Even in that case the question is asked: Does it belong to this or that category? Which may mean: Is it essentially this or that? For example, for hundreds of years, essentialist morphologists have asked whether phylloclades are shoot or leaf homologues, whether they are essentially shoots or leaves (see Cooney-Sovetts & Sattler 1987).

I think that essentialism has been the most influential worldview in plant morphology. In the 20th century, essentialist morphology has been spread to a great extent by Wilhelm Troll (1897–1978) and Donald R. Kaplan (1938–2007) who had many students who in turn had many students. Troll acknowledged explicitly the essentialist philosophical foundation of his morphological work. Kaplan adopted an evolutionary approach, but he kept asking the same either/or questions an essentialist would ask. Troll was deeply influenced by Goethe’s morphology (Goethe 1790, 1817–1824). To a great extent Goethe’s morphology can be considered essentialist when he emphasized the essential similarity or sameness of all lateral appendages by pointing out that in all their manifold manifestations they remain always one and the same organ, “ein und dasselbe Organ” (Goethe 1817,