In vol. 73 of this journal Johannes K{\"u}hl (2000), with reference to Rudolf Steiner{'}s so-called Bologna lecture, described, how he experienced the {`}I{'} when studying the behaviour of a gyroscope. He explicitly formulated the objective of his study: {``}not only to understand [the gyroscope] conceptually, but to understand in an experiencing manner (erlebend nachvollziehen){''}. As I failed to achieve this objective, I took the opportunity to produce what is called a {`}phenomenographic analysis{'} of this process of non-understanding. (Phenomenography is a recognised method in phenomenologic research of learning processes). As the method applied here of chaining non-understanding to understanding (Buck et al. 2002) may lead to a wider intersubjective understanding of both the gyroscope and the issue raised in Steiner{'}s Bologna lecture, it was considered worthwhile publishing the results in this journal.
Since in phenomenography, understanding can only be investigated indirectly from texts, (written) texts by Steiner, K{\"u}hl, Feynman and the author were taken as a basis for describing the content and process of individual understanding of both the gyroscope and Steiner{'}s statement. The discrepancy in K{\"u}hl{'}s and Buck{'}s understanding turned out to lie in K{\"u}hl{'}s explanatory approach combined with his use of traditional scientific (physical) terminology and methods (which usually show a tendency towards eliminating individual experience) where Buck had expected a phenomenal descriptive approach. A second discrepancy turned out to lie in the phenomenon treated: whereas K{\"u}hl focused on the phenomenon {`}behaviour of the gyroscope{'} (which is an abstract phenomenon), Buck had expected the {`}gyroscope as an integral phenomenon{'} (which is closer to perception) to be discussed.
Although the means used by K{\"u}hl failed in the case of Buck{'}s understanding, both individuals agreed in their self-appraisal of the {`}location{'} of subject and object during a genuine understanding process: It is the [mathematical] relationship between subject and object that makes up the understanding process, thus any separation between the {`}I{'} and the [mathematical or other] content of a cognition disappears on introspection of any genuine understanding process.
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In vol. 73 of this journal Johannes K{\"u}hl (2000), with reference to Rudolf Steiner{'}s so-called Bologna lecture, described, how he experienced the {`}I{'} when studying the behaviour of a gyroscope. He explicitly formulated the objective of his study: {``}not only to understand [the gyroscope] conceptually, but to understand in an experiencing manner (erlebend nachvollziehen){''}. As I failed to achieve this objective, I took the opportunity to produce what is called a {`}phenomenographic analysis{'} of this process of non-understanding. (Phenomenography is a recognised method in phenomenologic research of learning processes). As the method applied here of chaining non-understanding to understanding (Buck et al. 2002) may lead to a wider intersubjective understanding of both the gyroscope and the issue raised in Steiner{'}s Bologna lecture, it was considered worthwhile publishing the results in this journal.
Since in phenomenography, understanding can only be investigated indirectly from texts, (written) texts by Steiner, K{\"u}hl, Feynman and the author were taken as a basis for describing the content and process of individual understanding of both the gyroscope and Steiner{'}s statement. The discrepancy in K{\"u}hl{'}s and Buck{'}s understanding turned out to lie in K{\"u}hl{'}s explanatory approach combined with his use of traditional scientific (physical) terminology and methods (which usually show a tendency towards eliminating individual experience) where Buck had expected a phenomenal descriptive approach. A second discrepancy turned out to lie in the phenomenon treated: whereas K{\"u}hl focused on the phenomenon {`}behaviour of the gyroscope{'} (which is an abstract phenomenon), Buck had expected the {`}gyroscope as an integral phenomenon{'} (which is closer to perception) to be discussed.
Although the means used by K{\"u}hl failed in the case of Buck{'}s understanding, both individuals agreed in their self-appraisal of the {`}location{'} of subject and object during a genuine understanding process: It is the [mathematical] relationship between subject and object that makes up the understanding process, thus any separation between the {`}I{'} and the [mathematical or other] content of a cognition disappears on introspection of any genuine understanding process.
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