Getting rid of Metaphysics

Elemente der Naturwissenschaft 75, 2001, P. 61-78 | DOI: 10.18756/edn.75.61


When Immanuel Kant was awakened from what he termed his «dogmatic slumbers» by reading David Hume, he decided that there could be no justification for the metaphysical speculations of his day, and set out to discredit them. History has judged him correct - i.e., on the thought of his day, which was much given to speculation beyond experience, founded on nothing more than the common assumptions of society. Naturally, modern thought since Kant has attempted to defend it self from any accusation of «metaphysics». Since that thought has been deeply invested in the results of modern science, however, it did so by assuming that Kant’s project had been carried through by science. This conclusion followed from translating «metaphysics» as «beyond the physical», and substituting «physical reality» for «experience». The last substitution was made in order to advance a motion of reality that could not be identified with experience, but that very restriction has turned out to be problematic.

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